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Justice John Paul Stevens: An Initial Assessment
Branch Y. Ball* and Thomas M. Uhlman**
Compared to other recent nominations to the Supreme
Court, the selection and confirmation of John Paul Stevens was
relatively uneventful. One of the five men seriously considered for
the position, he was nominated by President Ford on November
28, 1975, only sixteen days after Justice Douglas tendered his
resignation. Confirmation hearings began in the Senate shortly
thereafter. Following three days of routine testimony,' the Senate
Judiciary Committee unanimously endorsed the Stevens nomination with less than a minute's debate. Over the next six days he
was roundly praised on the floor of the full Chamber and then
confirmed as the 10lst Justice of the Supreme Court by an overwhelming vote of ninety-eight to zero.2
Several factors contributed to the relative ease of the Stevens
nomination. First, he possessed the criteria established by President Ford for choosing Douglas' successor: relative youth (middle
aged), competence in law, and i n t e g r i t ~Fifty-five
.~
a t the time of
his nomination, Stevens graduated Phi Beta Kappa from the
University of Chicago, attended Northwestern University Law
School where he edited the law review and graduated first in his
class, clerked for Supreme Court Justice Wiley Rutledge, became
a partner in a prominent Chicago firm, and received high marks
as a judge on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.'
* B.A., 1973, Oregon State University; M.A., 1978, University of Missouri-St. Louis.
Mr. Ball specializes in the area of judical biography.
** Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri-St. Louis. B.A.,
1968, University of Rochester; M.A., 1971, Ph.D., 1975, University of North Carolina a t
Chapel Hill. Dr. Uhlman is the recipient of the 1976 Edward S. Corwin Award given by
the American Political Association for the best doctoral dissertation during the previous
two years in constitutional law, courts, or the judical process.
1. See Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, on
Nomination of John Paul Stevens, of Illinois, to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings
Before the Senate Judicary Committee].
2. 121 CONG.REC.39883, 40477, 40895-96, 41123-28 (1975).
3. Matthews, Ford Lists His Criteria for Picking Court Justice, St. Louis PostDispatch, Nov. 16, 1975, at 2A, col. 1.
4. For a more detailed analysis of Justice Stevens' background and career, see Elsasser, Ford Nominates Judge in Chicago to Supreme Court, Chi. Tribune, Nov. 29, 1975, a t
1, col. 1; McFadden, The President's Choice: John Paul Stevens, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29,
1975, a t 1, col. 6; Rich, Ford Picks Chicago Jurist, Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 1975, a t Al, col.
1.
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Strong support within the Ford administration and the legal
profession also greatly facilitated the nomination. Attorney General Levi was probably instrumental in bringing forth Stevens as
a possible nominee. The two had come to know each other well
at the University of Chicago School of Law where Levi had been
dean and Stevens had taught occasionally. Levi's enthusiastic
support was evident as soon as the nomination was made public.
"For the many who know Judge Stevens and for those who will
come to know him, I am sure it will be realized that the nomination is a commitment to e~cellence."~
Typical of the remarks
made of the Stevens nomination was one by Jerome Kurland,
professor of law at the University of Chicago. "He's a first-rate
lawyer, a first-rate judge and a first-rate person-more than that
you can't ask for."Vlaudits were also forthcoming from the
American Bar Association's Committee on the Federal Judiciary
which stated that Stevens "meets high standards of professional
competence, judicial temperament and integrity-the committee's highest evaluation. "'
Finally, Justice Stevens maintained a low political profile
throughout his professional career and, as a result, encountered
little opposition on ideological grounds. While on the court of
appeals he rarely appeared in nonlegal circles and once had even
delayed for two years an address to a Northwestern alumni group
for fear of making some improper public pronouncement. A prominent Chicago attorney characterized Stevens as "almost a nonpolitical animal? It is not surprising that when Stevens' name
was put forward, his political views were virtually unknown to
legalists throughout the country and to most Senators on Capitol
~i11.~
Clearly, Justice Stevens' intelligence, integrity, and career
accomplishments contributed greatly to his successful and relatively easy confirmation to the Supreme Court. But he also benefited materially from his noncontroversial tenure as a court of
appeals judge and his abstention from partisan political activity.
Unpleasant memories of the Fortas, Haynsworth, and Carswell
nominations made both the White House and the Senate eager
to avoid a similar confrontation over the Douglas replacement.
5. Isaacs, Specialist in Antitrust Law, Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 1975, at A5, col. 1 (quoting Attorney General Levi).
6. McFadden, supra note 4, at 1, 14, cols. 7, 4 (quoting Jerome Kurland).
7. Rich, supra note 4, at A l , col. 5.
8. Isaacs, supra note 5, at A5, col. 3.
9. See Senate Reaction Is Limited by Recess, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1975, at 14, col.
3.
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With Stevens they were able to do so easily. He possessed all the
necessary prerequisites for the position in addition to having powerful supporters and only token opposition.
The same factors that led to his successful confirmation also
had a significant unintended consequence. Because of his impeccable credentials and apolitical career, much less was known
about Justice Stevens' attitudes and beliefs than was known
about those of other Justices a t comparable stages in their careers. During the confirmation hearings he carefully avoided detailed answers to specific questions about his judicial philosphy
and was not pressed by his questioners.1° Attempts by journalists
and legal scholars to place an ideological label on Stevens were
just as inconclusive. He has been called a centrist, a moderate, a
moderate with conservative leanings, a centrist with progressive
leanings, and a conservative.l1 Others have found Stevens difficult, if not impossible to categorize.12
This Article will remove much of the uncertainty about Stevens' political views by systematically assessing his voting record
during his tenure on both the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court. This ideological assessment is made by
comparing the votes cast by Justice Stevens in economic and
personal liberty cases during his seven-year judicial career to
those of his colleagues on both courts. Because similar issues have
repeatedly arisen in the approximately 700 cases in which he has
participated, Stevens' general political attitudes and values can
be inferred from his voting patterns over time.
While not substituting for the systematic analysis that was
lacking at the time of his confirmation, this Article looks beyond
Stevens' credentials and qualifications to explore performance.
Moreover, after nearly two years on the Supreme Court, Justice
Stevens has begun to establish a record. This record will be compared to his past decisionmaking as well as to the records of his
judicial colleagues. The result will be a better understanding of
10. During the course of the judiciary hearings, for example, Senator Kennedy asked
Stevens whether he would label himself an "activist" or a "strict constructionist." He
replied, apparently satisfactorily, that he would not label himself. Hearings Before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, supra note 1, at 32. See also Siddon, Easy Senate OK
Expected for Stevens, Chi. Tribune, Dec. 8, 1975, at 7, col. 3.
11. Boyd, Judge Stevens-His Views on Law, Chi. Tribune, Nov. 30, 1975, at 6, col.
3; Matthews, Decisions Indicate Nominee for Court Is a Conservative, St. Louis PostDispatch, Nov. 30, 1975, at 2A, col. 1; Oelsner, Ford Chooses a Chicagoan for Supreme
Court; Nominee Is Appeals Judge, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1975, at 1, col. 8.
12. See Lewis, The Stevens Nomination, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1975, at 41, col. 4;
Oelsner, Factors in Court Choice, N.Y.Times, Nov. 30,1975, at 1, col. 1; Court Nominee
Is Hard to Label, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1975, Q 4, at 1, col. 3.
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the one member of the Burger Court who remains an ideological
enigma.

The primary approach to be used in analyzing Stevens' performance and, in turn, his ideology is called issue voting analysis.
His votes and those of his colleagues will be classified both by the
principal substantive question a t issue in a large number of cases
and by the degree of liberalism or conservatism expressed by their
votes in each case. Used frequently in judicial research,13 the
approach facilitates the comparison of judicial positions, patterns
of interaction, and the values and attitudes of individual jurists.
While not "better" than the more traditional analysis of individual opinions in selected cases, this approach does have certain
advantages. With cases in each subject matter area weighted
equally, an occasional publicized vote or opinion in a "landmark"
case will not have an inordinate influence on a Justice's overall
position. Also, in studying voting behavior across a series of cases,
trends become evident. This is particularly important here, where
one objective is to contrast Stevens' positions on two separate
courts.
During five years of service on the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, John Paul Stevens participated in 539 cases; 534 are
included in this analysis." After taking his seat on the Supreme
Court in January 1976, Stevens voted in 159 cases that had been
decided with full opinions by May 1, 1977; 152 of these are examined. l5
13. C. Herman Pritchett in his landmark study, C. PRITCHETT,
THEROOSEVELT
IN JUDICIAL
P O L ~ CAND
S VALUES1937-1947 (1948),was the first legal
COURT:A STUDY
scholar to uncover regularities in Supreme Court voting patterns that could be linked to
similar attitudes and values among the Justices. This pioneering work has been meaningfully extended in a number of directions in subsequent years. See, e.g., G. SCHUBERT,
OF JUDICUL
BEHAVIOR
(1959);Goldman, Conflict and Consensus in
QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS
the United States Courts of Appeals, 1968 WIS. L. REV. 461;Lamb, Warren Burger and
the Insanity Defense--Judicial Philosophy and Voting Behavior on a U.S. Court of Appeals, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 91 (1974);Loeb, Judicial Blocs and Judicial Values in Civil
Liberties Cases Decided by the Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, 14 AM.U.L. REV. 146 (1965);Schultz & Howard, The
Myth of Swing Voting:An Analysis of Voting Patterns on the Supreme Court, 50 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 798 (1975);Ulmer, Voting Blocs and "Access" to the Supreme Court: 1947-1956
Terms, 16 JURIMETRICS
J. 6 (1975).
14. These cases may be found in volumes 435-527of the Federal Reporter, Second
Series. Three labor cases not included in the Federal Reporter may be found in volumes
64, 68, and 69 of CCH Labor Cases. A complete list is also available from the authors at
the University of Missouri-St. Louis. Cases dealing with jurisdictional rather than substantive issues were excluded along with cases heard by Stevens sitting alone.
15. See Appendix I. These cases can be found in volumes 423-30of the United States
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Both sets of cases were divided into two broad categories;
those dealing with economic matters comprise one group,16and
personal liberty suits comprise the other." While other classificatory schemes are possible,18 the one adopted here is patterned
after similar, widely accepted efforts by leading scholars in the
field? The primary advantage of this partition is its capacity to
distinguish among these major and distinct types of policyrelevant cases while retaining comprehensiveness within each
category. As a result, judicial differences on broadly defined ideological positions can be compared across the variety of specific
economic and personal liberty questions that are considered by
the courts. At times classification was not easy, particularly when
several substantive issues were raised simultaneously. After reading the opinions in each case, however, a relatively straightforward judgment was usually possible based on the primary thrust
of the majority opinion.
After the cases were divided into categories, liberalismconservatism indices were developed as general indicators of judicial attitudes and values for each type of case heard before each
court.20Based on operational definitions of liberal and conservative positions on most major legal questions, the indices are summary measures and as such can be meaningfully applied across
a number of subject matter areas. A liberal position in a case was
defined as support for federal regulation or for the litigant who
represented the less privileged or relatively disadvantaged social,
economic, or political group or interest in society. Conversely,
conservatism was operationalized as support for the party that
Reports. Cases were excluded if they focused on jurisdictional matters, were disposed of
via an order, or were decided by a Justice sitting alone on an appeals bench.
16. Cases in the economic category present substantive issues concerning: bankruptcy, business, consumer interests, environmental protection, insurance claims, labormanagement disputes, patents, copyrights, antitrust, personal injury, social security
claims, stockholders' claims, taxation, landlord-tenant controversies, unemployment
compensation, and federal-state or state-state economic disputes.
17. Cases in the personal liberty category present substantive issues concerning:
criminal law suits, criminal defendant petitions, and civil rights litigation involving ethnic
or racial minorities, aliens, or conscientious objectors.
18. See, e.g., Ulmer & Stookey, Nixon's Legacy to the Supreme Court: A Statistical
Analysis of Judicial Behavior, 3 FLA.ST. U.L. REV.331 (1975) (criminal cases and noncriminal cases in which government is a litigant).
19. The first such classification was developed by Pritchett and has been utilized
THE
with slight modification by Schubert and Goldman, among others. See C. PRITCHETT,
ROOSEVELT
COURT:A STUDY
IN JUDICIAI
POLITICS
AND VALUES
1937-1947, a t 253-63 (2d ed.
THEJUDICIAL
MIND97-157 (1965); Goldman, Conflict on the U.S.
1969); G. SCHUBERT,
Courts of Appeals 1965-1971:A Quantitative Analysis, 42 U . CIN.L. REV.
635,642 (1973).
20. These indices complement but do not replace detailed analyses of judicial positions on specific legal questions.
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enjoyed the relative social, economic, or political advantage or
favor in each case.21For example, in a landlord-tenant controversy (an economic case) a vote in favor of the landlord was
classified as a generally conservative position while support for
the tenant was considered liberal. Similarly, a vote against a
party making a civil rights claim was treated as conservative
while a positionin favor of this type of personal liberty issue was
considered liberal?
Within this classificatory scheme, values were assigned to
Justice Stevens' votes as well as those of his colleagues sitting
with him on a case. The author of the majority opinion usually
received a score of either +1 or -1 depending upon whether he
took a liberal (positive score) or conservative (negative score)
position in the case.23When the author of the majority split on
the issue, for example, by upholding a personal liberty claim in
part and denying it in part, he received a score of 0. Judges
joining the author of the majority opinion received the same score
(+1for a liberal stance, -1 for a conservative position, 0 for a split
opinion).
Judges concurring with the majority, assuming the opinion
was liberal, received a score of either +1.5 or +0.5 depending
upon whether their concurrence was more or less liberal than the
opinion of the majority. Likewise, judges concurring with the
majority in a conservative decision received either a -1.5 or -0.5
score. Judges concurring in a split majority opinion were assigned
a score of either +0.5 or -0.5 depending upon whether the concurrence was more or less liberal than the majority opinion.z4Judges
concurring in part and dissenting in part were given scores of 0.
A dissenting judge usually received a score opposite in sign from
that of the author of the majority opinion. Therefore, scores for
various judges' positions in an individual case could conceivably
range from +1.5 to -1.5.
Some subjectivity and error are inevitable in interpreting
judges' general ideological positions from their votes and opinions
across a broad range of specific cases. The usefulness of the resulting measure, however, far outweighs its shortcomings, and in the
21. These definitions are derived from those developed by MacIver and Nagel. See
R. MACIVER,
THEWEBOF GOVERNMENT
162 (rev. ed. 1965); Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 AM.POL.SCI.REV.843, 846-47 (1961).
22. Appendix II presents a complete listing of liberal and conservative positions on
the various legal questions that came before the courts on which Stevens sat.
23. The sign designations of liberal-positive and conservative-negative were arbitrar:
ily assigned.
24. Concurring opinions that could not be distinguished ideologically were assigned
values identical to the majority opinion.
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vast majority of cases the distinctions were clear and could be
made without difficulty. The scale itself represents an improvement over similar efforts undertaken in the past. Goldman utilized only three categories in differentiating ideological voting on
the United States Courts of Appeals (equivalent to 1 (liberal),
0 (split), -1 (conservative)); differences of opinion that motivated
judges to author concurring opinions or separate dissents were
ignored as the judges were grouped in one of the three primary
categorie~.~~
When these differences of opinion based on varying
ideological perspectives appeared in the present study, they were
measured by adjusting scale scores in the appropriate liberal or
conservative direction (+.5 or -.5); these adjusted scores were
then utilized along with the more common joint opinion scores in
computing the ideological voting average for each judge.26
After the cases in each category were examined and values
assigned, the scores were totaled and averaged for each judge.
The result is a relative ranking that is useful in understanding the
ideological complexion of both courts on which Justice Stevens
has served, his relative position within them, and possible
changes in his position as he moved from one court to the other.
Except for occasional absences due to illness or disqualification, the same group of Justices voted with Stevens in the 152
Supreme Court cases included in this analysis. This constancy
makes the ideological scores for all the Justices representative
and the comparisons among them reliable. As a group, they responded to the same sets of facts, issues in controversy, and public policy questions. Unfortunately, group stability is not found
on the court of appeals bench. Justice Stevens heard cases with
thirty-one different judges in economic suits and thirty-six different jurists in personal liberty cases. Because of the varying composition of circuit panels, several of these jurists sat with Stevens
only once or twice. In order to avoid misleading conclusions based
on a small number of cases decided in common, only judges who
sat with Stevens a minimum of fifteen times in either economic
or personal liberty cases are retained in the court of appeals anal-

+

25. See Goldman, supra note 19, at 642; Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United
REV.374 (1966).
States Courts of Appeals 1961-1964, 60 AM. POL.SCI.
26. When actually classified, the judges' votes were coded at +1 or -1 in the majority
of instances. In fact, the more subtle ideological distinctions reflected in separate concurrences or dissents appeared, on the average, in less than 10% of the votes cast by each
judge. When they did occur, they followed expected patterns. For example, the most
liberal positions (+ 1.5) were embraced exclusively by judges whose overall voting averages
were liberal.
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ysis. After using the fifteen case cutoff, ten judges, including
Stevens, remained in each category.

During his tenure on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
John Paul Stevens sat on 233 panels which rendered decisions in
economic cases. As indicated in Table 1, his ideological position
as measured by his votes in these cases was moderate. The slight
liberal tendency (+0.15) should be minimized because, when
viewed from the perspective of the entire scale (+ 1.5 to -1.5),
Stevens departs only marginally from an ideologically neutral
position. Stevens' score in relation to those of his colleagues on
the Seventh Circuit indicates perhaps more clearly that he was
an economic moderate. While the "court" as a whole (more appropriately this group of ten justices) may have voted in a slightly
liberal manner, only Judge Castle's voting average (+0.75) falls
outside the middle third of the scale (+0.5 to -0.5). Stevens lies
in the center of this group of economic moderates with a voting
record nearly identical to the average of his colleague^.^^ On the
Supreme Court, Stevens has confronted a different collection of
economic cases with a different group of judicial colleagues. Has
his response varied?
TABLE
1-Economic Cases : Average Ideo1ogica.l Voting Scores of
Justice Stevens and O t h e r Judges on. the Seventh Circuita
Judge

Ideological Scoresb

Number of Cases

Castle
Sprecher
Campbelle
Hastings
Stevens
Fairchild
Pel1
Kiley
Cummings
Swygert
Court mean

The judges included s a t with Stevens on a minimum of 15 cases.
Scores may range from +1.5 (liberal) t o -1.5 (conservative).
c Judge Campbell was a district court judge sitting by designation.

a

b

27. Because they comprise a major portion of the total, Justice Stevens' votes heavily
influence the court of appeals averages in Tables 2 and 4. Nevertheless, these figures, when
interpreted in conjunction with the individual scores, represent useful indicators of the
general ideological complexion of the court.
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Table 2 indicates that it has not. Based on his votes in the
first seventy-two economic cases in which he participated as a
Supreme Court Justice, Stevens' record is again only slightly
removed from the midpoint of the ideological scale, and his average (+0.18) lies well within the moderate third. While there is
some variation among individual Justices, the voting average for
the entire Court in economic cases (+0.10) is quite close to
Stevens'. Individually, Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist are the
only Justices on the conservative side of the scale's midpoint.
Marshall, Brennan, and White are the Court's most progressive
members, while Blackmun and Burger, in addition to Stevens,
comprise a centrist third. In spite of this modest voting variation
among individual Justices, the Court, like Justice Stevens, appears to be basically moderate on economic policy.
TABLE2-Economic Cases :Average Ideological Voting
Scores o f Supreme C o u r t Justices
Justice

Ideological Scores

Number of Cases

Marshall
Brennan
White

Stevens
Blackmun
Burger
Stewart
Powell
Rehnquist
Court mean

=

+0.10

The moderate position taken by individual Justices over all
cases may obscure significant differences among them on various
types of economic controversies. To observe these patterns of
agreementldisagreement, Table 3 presents the voting alignment
among individual pairs of Justices. The top right-hand portion of
the table indicates the frequency with which any two Justices
voted together in the majority (++), the dissent (--), or took
opposite positions (+- or -+). The bottom left-hand portion displays the overall degree of voting compatibility between pairs of
Justices; the figures are the percentages of votes cast together in
both the majority or dissenting opinions in the economic cases.28
28. No distinction is made between concurring and joint opinions. To facilitate presentation, the table simply indicates the general alignment of pairs of Justices in majority
or dissenting opinions.

TABLE3-Vating Relationsh/ips Among Supreme
Court Justices in Economic Cases
MA

BR

WH

JPS

BL

BU

MA
BR

94.4

WH

87.5

JPS
-

77.8

BL

81.7

BU

81.9

ST

71.8

PO

76.5

RE

70.8

MA=Marshall, BR=Brennan, WH =White, JPS-Stevens, BL=Blackmun,
BU=Burger, ST=Stewart, PO=Powell, RE-Rehnquist
Upper right: +vote cast in majority
v o t e cast in dissent
Lower left: percentage agreement in both majority and dissent

ST

PO

RE
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The absence of sweeping differences among the Justices over
general economic policy first noted in Table 2 is confirmed in
Table 3. All the Justices agree substantially more often than they
disagree. This is not to say, however, that differences fail to
emerge. Rates of agreement vary significantly from BrennanMarshall, Burger-Blackmun, Burger-Powell, and StewartRehnquist, who voted together over 90% of the time, to Rehnquist-Brennan who.agree on less than two-thirds of their votes.
With one exception, Justice Stevens joins with his colleagues
between 70 and 80%of the time. In fact, he displays the smallest
variation in agreement rates on the entire bench and is the only
member of the Court not to vote with a fellow Justice in a t least
80% of the cases. Stevens' highest rates of agreement are with
Justices White (79.2%)and Blackmun (78.9%), the two men closest to him in their overall ideological scores (Table 2).
One interpretation of Stevens' record might be that as a new
member of the Court he is feeling his way, waiting until he has
gained experience to establish firm positions on economic matters. His behavior may be contrasted to more senior Justices who
have strongly held views on certain types of economic controversies and would therefore be in more consistent agreement or disagreement when these issues are heard. Considering his court of
appeals record, however, a more likely explanation is that as a
true economic moderate, Justice Stevens frequently finds himself
in agreement with both the moderatehiberal and the moderate/conservative Justices on the Court.
This initial assessment of Justice Stevens' voting highlights
his moderate stance on economic issues and the consistency with
which he has maintained his position on both benches. Perhaps
facilitating his transition to the Supreme Court is the ideological
congruence between the two courts. Stevens confronted a strikingly similar configuration of attitudes on economic policy as he
moved from one court to the other. In both, moderate views have
dominated, and within both, Stevens assumed a centrist position.

The picture of John Paul Stevens as a centrist is not markedly altered by examining his votes in personal liberty cases while
a court of appeals judge (Table 4). However, differences do appear when the court's general voting patterns in personal liberty
and economic cases are contrasted. The most notable may be a
shift from a liberal to a conservative decisionmaking trend. While
the court as a whole, and Justice Stevens in particular, must still
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be considered moderate rather than either conservative or liberal,
the consistency in the voting averages may highlight what
amounts to an ideological emphasis in both types of cases.
TABLE4--Personal Liberty Cases :Ave.rage Zdeoloyical
Voting Scores of Justice Stevens and Other
Judges on the Seventh Circuita
Judge
-

Ideological Scoresb

Number of Cases

--

Castle
Fairchild
Kiley
Sprecher
Hastings
Swygert
Stevens
Cummings
Pell
Duffy
Court mean
a

b

The judges included sat with Stevens on a minimum of 15 cases.
Scores may range from +1.5 (liberal) to -1.5 (conservative).

If such an ideological emphasis exists, it is more pronounced
in personal liberty cases. Justice Stevens is the fourth most conservative in this ranking with an average score of -0.37. All of the
judges are on the conservative side of the scale compared to eight
out of ten on the liberal side in economic cases. Two judges, Pell
and Duffy, fall in the conservative third of the personal liberty
scale while only one judge is within the liberal third of the economic scale. Finally, the average score for the court as a whole is
nearly twice as far from the ideological midpoint on the scale in
personal liberty cases (-0.29) than in economic cases (+0.15).
These patterns may mean that while moderate positions predominate on both types of issues, judges on the Seventh Circuit
would, for example, be somewhat more likely to decide cases
against the criminal defendant or civil liberties claimant than
they would be to decide in favor of a consumer, employee, or
insurance claimant.
On the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens' relative position on
personal liberty cases has changed slightly (Table 5). Though his
score is still negative (-0.07), his votes rank him as the third most
liberal member of the Burger Court. Togethe~with Justice Stewart, Stevens has remained essentially unaligned in the decision
of all eighty personal liberty cases, relatively far removed ideologically from the liberals Marshall and Brennan, the conservative
Rehnquist, and the moderate/conservative Burger.
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TABLEti-Personal

L i b e r t y Cases :Average Ideologicct 1
Voting Scores o f Supreme Court Justices

Justice
Marshall
Brennan
Stevens
Stewart
White
Blackmun
Powell
Burger
Rehnquist
Court mean

Ideological Scores

=

Number of Cases

-0.09

The Court as a whole has been more sharply divided over
personal liberty than economic questions. This is evident initially in the wide range of average scores (+0.62 to -0.64) and by
the three Justices (Marshall, Brennan, and Rehnquist) whose
voting averages fall outside the middle or moderate third of the
scale. These intracourt divisions are further highlighted by the
patterns of agreement/disagreement among pairs of individual
Justices (Table 6).
Voting agreement is extremely high among several Justices.
Only once in seventy-seven cases did Marshall and Brennan fail
to agree whether in the majority or in the dissent. Likewise, in
the vast majority of cases, Burger and Rehnquist (88.8%), Stewart and Powell (88.8%),and White and Blackmun (87.3%) voted
together. This ideological compatibility stands in sharp contrast
to the frequent disagreement between the Court's liberal members (Marshall and Brennan) and conservative Rehnquist and
moderate/conservative Burger. Agreement among these various
pairs of Justices of between 40 and 51% is far lower than the
lowest agreement rate in economic cases.
Stevens' moderate position in personal liberty cases is illustrated by his consistent rate of agreement with his colleagues on
both ends of the Court's ideological spectrum. While personal
liberty conservatives disagree with their liberal counterparts
more often than not, Justice Stevens has aligned himself nearly
equally with both factions on the Court; he voted with Marshall
and Brennan as well as Burger and Rehnquist between 65 and
68% of the time. Stevens again demonstrates the most consistent
level of agreement with the rest of his colleagues, ranging from a
high of 78.8% with Justice Powell to a low of only 64.9% with
Justice Marshall. His most frequent dissents have come with the

TABLE6-Voting Relationships Among Supre,me Court
Justices in Personal Liberty Cases
MA

BR

JPS

ST

WH

MA
BR

98.7

JPS 64.9

7

ST

68.8

WH 62.3
BL

59.7

PO

59.7

BU

50.6

RE

40.3

MA=Marshall, BR=Brennan, JPS =Stevens, ST=Stewart, WH =White
BL=Blackmun, PO=Powell, BU =Burger, RE=Rehnquist
Upper right: +vote cast in majority
-vote cast in dissent
Lower left: percentage agreement in both majority and dissent

BL

PO

BU

RE
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liberals Marshall and Brennan while he has yet to dissent with
Burger and has done so only once with White, Blackmun, and
Powell.
Even though Stevens' decisions on the circuit court level
were slightly more conservative than his Supreme Court votes in
personal liberty matters, no real liberal trend is indicated. Some
of the difference in his absolute scores on both courts may be due
to the types of personal liberty cases heard. Because of the nature
of the claims and/or the claimants, it may have been more difficult to take a liberal position on cases heard by the Seventh
Circuit. Although his relative position changed somewhat, he has
remained within the broadly defined center of both courts. In
sum, any slight ideological shift in personal liberty cases by Stevens is clearly overshadowed by both an overall position of moderation within each court and frequent alignment with the two
sharply divided ideological factions on the Burger Court.

IV. CONCLUSIONS
At the time of his confirmation, John Paul Stevens may well
have been considered to be a conservative or a progressive by
some of those who scrutinized his credentials. However, a systematic examination of his judicial performance reveals that these
labels were as inappropriate two years ago as they are today.
Alternative assessments of Stevens as a moderate with liberal or
conservative leanings are also wide of the mark, as his votes in
over 700 cases fail to reveal a significant or sustained trend in one
ideological direction or another. While perhaps not generating as
much interest or attention as a more exotic political label, moderation and moderation alone appears to be the most accurate characterization of Justice Stevens' attitudes toward economic and
personal liberty questions. In five years of service on the court of
appeals and two years on the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens has
maintained a centrist position with a marked degree of consistency.
If his moderate positions enable Stevens to bridge the ideological gap between left and right, particularly in personal liberty
cases, the Court as a whole will be strengthened. Based on his
record to date, this outcome appears increasingly probable. Stevens has passed through his initial period of adjustment without
becoming closely aligned with either an ideological bloc or another Justice on the Court. In all likelihood, Stevens will continue
to utilize his considerable legal skills in conjunction with his independence and political moderation to become a unifying force on
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the Court in the years ahead. In cases where compromise is not
possible and the Court remains closely divided, Stevens' moderate views will often enable him to cast the determinative vote. His
pivotal position as a "swing" Justice may arise frequently in the
future, particularly if the votes of President Carter's initial appointments to the Court offset those of the more conservative
Justices chosen during the Nixon years.
Misperceptions about Stevens' political ideology a t the time
of his selection highlight a serious shortcoming in the confirmation process. While infrequently acknowledged candidly, a candidate's general ideological or political outlook is an important factor in a Senator's decision to support or oppose c o n f i r m a t i ~ n . ~ ~
While perhaps justified on other grounds, both opposition and
support have been shown to be strongly related to the congruence
or incongruence between a Senator's own ideology and his perceptions of the candidate's ideology? Depending upon the source in
Stevens' case, these perceptions may well have been wrong.
Major political decisions such as a vote on a Supreme Court
appointment should not remain based, as they have been, on
impressions, partial truths, or misinformation derived from a
hasty or incomplete sampling of a nominee's prior public record.
A comprehensive examination of the entire record emphasizing
the general political factors that will, a t least in part, determine
a Senator's vote is a necessary supplement to the traditional analyses of education, career, and professional credential^.^' For Justice Stevens, it would have served as an accurate and useful predictor of his initial Supreme Court voting record.
Would this information, if known a t Stevens' confirmation
hearings, have changed the ultimate outcome? Given the political
circumstances a t the time, almost certainly not. Partisan differences between a Republican White House and a heavily Demo29. The same factors are considered by the President, the Attorney General, and their
staffs in making Supreme Court as well as most lower court nominations. See J. SCHMIDCOURT:
ITS POLITICS,
PERSONALITIES
AND PROCEDURES
(1960); Black,
HAUSER,
THE SUPREME
A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nom.inees, 79 YALEL.J. 657 (1970);
Goldman, Judicial Appointments to the United States Courts of Appeals, 1967 WIS. L.
REV.186; Goldman, Characteristics of Eisenhower and Kennedy Appointees to the Lower
Federal Courts, 18 W . POL.Q. 755 (1965).
SUPREME
COURTDECISION
MAKING
98-117 (1976). These
30. D. ROHDE& H. SPAETH,
findings indicate that Senators already heed Professor Black's suggestion and scrutinize
Supreme Court nominees on ideological grounds. Black, supra note 29.
31. Although recent Supreme Court nominees have not all been judges, they have all
had extensive records of public service. Therefore, similar examinations for candidates
without prior judicial experience should also be possible using different indicators of
attitudes and beliefs.
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cratic Senate, the furor generated by previous nominations, and
fears expressed by some over a sharp swing to the right by the
Burger Court made a political moderate with exceptional credentials such as Stevens the ideal choice. In the future, as in the
immediate past, however, political necessities may not mesh with
a nominee's qualifications so nicely. If so, there may well be a
compelling need to accurately assess ideology as well as legal
craftsmanship and integrity in evaluating a Supreme Court nomination. Hopefully, information will be available to make such an
assessment possible.
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Economic Cases

Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S.
682 (1976) (corporations, international law).
American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Starnes, 425 U.S. 637
(1976) (corporations).
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Commission, 430 U.S. 442 (1977) (government regulation of business).
Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. N L R B , 429 U.S. 298 (1977)
(labor-management).
Boston Stock Exchange v. State T a x Commission, 429 U.S.
318 (1977) (government regulation of business).
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477
(1977) (antitrust).
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (taxation).
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976)
(labor-management).
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (social security).
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (social security).
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (antitrust).
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (government
regulation of business).
Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73 (1976) (government regulation of
business).
City of Charlotte v. Local 660, International Association of
Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283 (1976) (labor-management).
City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668
(1976) (government regulation of business).
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 430 U.S. 141 (1977)
(federal-state) .
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) (government regulation of business).
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977)
(taxation).
Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73
(1977) (damages).
Diamond National Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, 425
U.S. 268 (1976) (taxation).
Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648 (1977) (personal
injury).
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E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977)
(environmental regulation).
E P A v. California ex rel. S t a t e Water Resources Control
Board, 426 U.S. 200 (1976) (environmental regulation).
Farmer v. Carpenters & Joiners Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977)
(labor-management).
FEA v. Algonquin Sng, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976) (government
regulation of business).
FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271 (1976) (government regulation of business).
FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326
(1976) (government regulation of business).
Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Association,
426 U.S. 776 (1976) (government regulation of business).
G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977)
(taxation).
Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976) (environmental regulation).
Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S.
738 (1976) (antitrust).
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (government regulation of business).
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (government
regulation of business).
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (bankruptcy).
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (federal-state).
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (environmental
regulation).
Knebel v. Hein, 429 U.S. 288 (1977) (welfare).
Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305
(1977) (labor-management).
Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 427 U.S. 132 (1976)
(labor-management).
Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976) (social security).
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (social security).
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (social security).
Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463
(1976) (taxation).
Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976) (damages).
National Bank of North America v. Associates of Obstetrics
& Female Surgery, 425 U.S. 460 (1976) (damages).
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N L R B u. Pipefitters Local 638, 429 U.S. 507 (1977) (labormanagement).
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)
(federal-state) .
New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363 (1976) (state-state).
Nolde Brothers v. Local 358, Bakery & Confectionary
Workers, 430 U.S . 243 (1977) (labor-management).
Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollow breast, 425 U.S. 649
(1976) (property rights).
Norton v. Matthews, 427 U.S. 524 (1976) (social security).
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers u. Mobile Oil Corp., 426
U.S. 407 (1976) (labor-management).
Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Coruallis Sand & Gravel
Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977) (government regulation of business).
Pearson v. Dodd, 429 U.S. 396 (1977) (taxation).
Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (damages).
Radzanower u. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976) (damages).
Ralston Purina Co. v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 426
U.S. 476 (1976) (government regulation of business).
Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976) (patent).
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)
(stockholdings) .
South Prairie Construction Co. v. Local 627, International
Union of Operating Engineers, 425 U.S. 800 (1976) (labormanagement).
Texas v. Louisiana, 426 U.S. 465 (1976) (state-state).
Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) (environmental regulation).
United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, 426 U.S. 500
(1976) (government regulation of business).
United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977) (taxation).
United States v. Florida, 425 U.S. 791 (1976) (federal-state).
United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32 (1976) (taxation).
United States v. Hopkins, 427 U.S. 123 (1976) (personal injury ).
[Jnited States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976) (personal injury).
United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976) (taxation).
United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429
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U.S. 610 (1977) (antitrust).
Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401 (1977) (labor-management).
Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 569 (1977)
(taxation).
23.

Personal Liberty Cases

Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (civil rights).
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (criminal rights).
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (civil liberties).
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (criminal rights).
Brown v. General Services Adrninstration, 425 U.S. 820
(1976) (civil rights).
Bucolo v. Adkins, 424 U.S. 641 (1976) (criminal rights).
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (criminal rights).
Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976) (civil rights).
City of Madison Joint School District No. 8 v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (civil
liberties).
Codd u. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977) (civil liberties).
Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Pine Creek Conservancy District,
429 U.S. 651 (1977) (civil liberties).
Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977) (criminal rights).
Connor v. Coleman, 425 U.S. 675 (1976) (civil liberties).
Costello v. Wainwright, 430 U. S. 325 (1977) (criminal rights).
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (civil liberties).
Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (criminal rights).
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (criminal rights).
East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636
(1976) (civil liberties).
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (civil rights).
Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (civil liberties).
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (civil rights).
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (criminal rights).
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (civil
rights).
Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94 (1976) (criminal
rights).
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (criminal rights).
Guste v. Jackson, 429 U.S. 399 (1977) (civil liberties).
Hampton v. Mow S u n Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (civil liberties).
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976) (criminal rights).
Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Education Association, 426 U.S. 482 (1976) (civil liberties).
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Hutto u. Ross, 429 U.S. 28 (1976) (criminal rights).
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Bagamas bad, 429
U.S. 24 (1976) (civil liberties).
Electrical Workers Local 790 v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429
U.S. 229 (1976) (civil rights).
Jurek u. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (criminal rights).
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1976)
(civil rights).
Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U. S. 618 (1976) (criminal
rights).
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) (criminal
rights).
Mc Carthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission, 424
U.S. 645 (1976) (civil liberties).
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S.
273 (1976) (civil rights).
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (criminal rights).
Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976) (criminal rights).
Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976) (criminal rights).
Moore u. United States, 429 U.S. 20 (1976) (criminal rights).
Morales v. Turman, 430 U.S. 322 (1977) (criminal rights).
Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1976) (civil liberties).
N A A CP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662 (1976) (civil rights).
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)
(civil liberties).
New York Civil Service Commission v. Sneed, 425 U.S. 457
(1976) (civil liberties).
Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308
(1977) (civil liberties).
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (criminal rights).
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (civil
liberties).
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S . 242 (1976) (criminal rights).
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (criminal rights).
Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U .S. 736 (1976) (civil
liberties).
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (civil rights).
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States &
Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (civil liberties).
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (civil liberties).
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (criminal
rights).
Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U.S. 501 (1977) (civil liberties).
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Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (criminal rights).
Swain v. Bessley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977) (criminal rights).
Tennessee v. Dunlap, 426 U.S. 312 (1976) (civil liberties).
Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, Inc.,
430 U.S. 259 (1977) (civil liberties).
United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144
(1977) (civil liberties).
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (criminal rights).
United States v. Board of Supervisors, 429 U.S. 642 (1977)
(civil liberties).
United States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6 (1976) (criminal rights).
United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977) (criminal
rights).
United States v. Kopp, 429 U.S. 121 (1976) (criminal rights).
United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976) (criminal
rights).
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (criminal rights).
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (criminal rights).
United States v. Morrison, 429 U.S. 1 (1976) (criminal
rights).
United States v. Rose, 429 U.S. 5 (1976) (criminal rights).
United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 ('1976) (criminal
rights).
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (criminal
rights).
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (civil rights).
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) (criminal rights).
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (civil liberties).
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (criminal
rights).
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976)
(civil liberties).
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Economic Cases

A judge was considered to have taken a liberal (conservative)
position when he voted for (against) :
1. The debtor in a bankruptcy suit.
2. The regulatory agency or government in a business
regulatory suit.
3. The smaller of two businesses or the subcontractor in
an exclusively business suit.
4. The individual and against (for) the business.
5. The consumer in a consumer-seller suit.
6. The proenvironmentalist or government in an environmental suit.
7. The insurance claimant.
8. The labor union in a labor-management suit.
9. The employee in an employee-labor union, employeemanagement, or employee-labor union and management
dispute.
10. The national union in a local-national union suit.
11. The alleged patent or copyright infringer in a patent
or copyright suit.
12. The party alleging antitrust law violations.
13. The injured party or party claiming damages in a
personal injury or damage suit, or the party claiming the
greater injury or damage in suits where both parties are
seeking relief.
14. The social security, welfare, or pension claimant.
15. The individual stockholders in a stockholdercorporate suit.
16. The government in taxation suits.
17. The tenant in landlord-tenant litigation.
18. The unemployed in unemployment compensation
suits.
19. The federal government in a suit against a state.
20. The state in an inferior economic position in a suit
against a state in a superior position.

B. Personal Liberty Cases
A judge was considered to have taken a liberal (conservative)
position when he voted for (against):
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1. The accused criminal defendant.
2. The incarcerated prisoner seeking relief via petition.
3. The expansion or broad interpretation of criminal
rights.
4. The party alleging the infringement of civil rights or
liberties.
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